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EDITORIAL
Following a period of stagnation, the euro 
area economy started to turn around in the 
middle of last year. In line with the scenario 
embodied in the Commission’s Autumn 
2003 Economic Forecast, recovery in the 
euro-area economy is slowly gaining 
momentum. 
Some recent economic indicators have, 
however, come in slightly below 
expectations. Together with the headline 
grabbing rise in the euro to above its 
introductory level 5 years ago, these have 
caused some anxiety about the euro-area’s 
near term prospects. They have also 
rekindled memories of past recoveries 
having been slow and marred by temporary 
setbacks. 
Against this background, this Quarterly 
Report assesses the most recent 
developments and economic indicators. 
These suggest that the recovery in the euro 
area economy will remain fairly moderate 
over the months to come. Following the 
initial export driven phase of the recovery, 
we now seem to be heading towards a 
greater domestic contribution to growth. 
In this context, it is particularly welcome 
news that the long-awaited revival in 
investment expenditure seems to be 
materialising. Coupled with favourable 
monetary and financial conditions, with 
both short- and long-term real interest rates 
remaining at historical lows, and the gradual 
restoration of profit margins, it suggests that 
the recovery may gather strength. A 
turnaround in investment would be of 
particular importance in light of the leading 
role played by investment in the current 
cycle. Less positive is that private 
consumption growth - a topic looked at in 
detail in this report -, has been more 
hesitant. The slow growth in households’ 
purchasing power as inflation has proved 
stickier than expected is one factor. Another 
one is that, although gradually firming, 
consumer confidence remains low.  
With indicators on the domestic front being 
still somewhat mixed, it is comforting to 
note that survey indicators suggest that 
exports will continue to buttress growth in 
the months ahead. Indeed, the analysis 
presented in this report’s focus section on 
the impact of the strong euro on growth 
suggests that buoyant world demand will 
more than offset losses in market shares due 
to deteriorating competitiveness. Part of the 
explanation seems to be that euro-area 
exports are more sensitive to changes in 
income abroad than in prices. Furthermore, 
while the negative effect of the euro 
appreciation on competitiveness and profit 
margins has already come to be felt, the 
positive effects of the strong euro on 
households’ purchasing power are to a large 
extent still in the pipeline and can be 
expected to gain importance over the 
coming months.  
All in all, while some less positive than 
hoped for developments illustrate the still 
high uncertainty surrounding the strength 
and the nature of the upswing, the recovery 
of the euro area remains on track. To use a 
metaphor, the first green shoots of recovery 
that I referred to last autumn have definitely 
become longer but some more time is 
needed before we will see the blossom. 
Against the still uncertain economic 
background, policy makers have a key role 
to play in supporting the recovery. First, by 
maintaining sound macroeconomic 
conditions which provide the very platform 
for any durable recovery. Furthermore, by 
implementing the structural reforms aimed 
at increasing employment and productivity 
growth and therewith our growth potential 
and future living standards. 
By leading the way, policy makers can shore 
up confidence among businesses and 
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households alike and trigger job-creating 
investment and a recovery in private 
consumption. In short, policy makers have 
to match their words by action and get 
serious about implementing more forcefully 
the kind of policies advocated in the 
Community’s Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines. 
This basic policy message was once more 
underlined by the Spring European Council 
gathering in Brussels over the weekend. 
 
Pedro SOLBES 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION
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Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
 03 Q1 03 Q2 03 Q3 03 Q4 Average 2003 
Carryover in 
2004 
 % change on previous quarter, volumes(1) 
GDP 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Private consumption 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.2 
Government consumption 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.9 0.9 
Gross fixed capital formation -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 0.6 -1.2 0.3 
Changes in inventories (% of 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 
Exports of goods and services -1.5 -0.9 2.3 0.2 0.0 1.1 
Imports of goods and services -0.6 -0.4 0.8 2.1 1.5 1.9 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 
Government consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 
Gross fixed capital formation -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Changes in inventories 0.2 0.1 -0.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 
Net exports -0.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 
(1) Annual change in % for carryover. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Following a gradual turnaround in economic activity in the euro area in the summer of last year, recent data on economic 
activity have sent somewhat mixed signals as regards the pace of the recovery in the near future. Real GDP growth slowed 
marginally in the fourth quarter of 2003, on the back of persistent weakness in private consumption. Business confidence 
has marked a pause and the appreciation of the euro appears to increasingly weigh on external competitiveness. However, 
the level of business confidence remains relatively high, consumer confidence is strengthening gradually, the investment slump 
may have come to an end and world demand is buoyant. Overall, the recovery remains on track but the recent softening of 
some indicators suggests that short-term downside risks may have increased. The persistent weakness of private consumption 
is a source of concern. The lacklustre performance of household spending in recent years can partly be explained by sluggish 
growth in disposable income and lagged adverse wealth effects. However, consumption appears to be weaker than what 
normally would be expected given the level of its main macroeconomic determinants. This could be suggestive of negative 
confidence effects linked to the deterioration of public finances in some Member States, to the increasing awareness of the 
challenges posed by population ageing and to the uncertainty generated by a very slow structural reform process.  
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1 
Fourth quarter real GDP growth marginally 
slower than expected despite a strengthening 
of industrial activity 
Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth decelerated 
marginally from 0.4% in the third quarter to 0.3% 
in the last quarter of 2003. The deceleration was 
mainly the consequence of a deterioration in net 
                                                     
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 23 March 2004.  
exports in a context of persistently weak private 
consumption. Domestic demand picked up 
markedly but the increase mainly reflected a 
strong contribution of changes in inventories. 
Following a sharp, and probably partly 
unintended, inventory draw-down in the third 
quarter, enterprises replenished their stocks in the 
final months of 2003. Investment registered its 
first increase after three quarters of contraction 
but private consumption remained almost flat. 
After a surge in the third quarter, exports of 
goods and services increased only marginally in 
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the fourth quarter. In the meantime, imports 
picked up substantially, partly as a result of the 
inventory build-up. 
The slight deceleration of GDP is surprising in 
the light of the strengthening of industrial activity 
in the last quarter of 2003, as measured both by 
the industrial production index and production 
developments in business surveys. Looking at the 
sectoral breakdown of value added, the slight 
slowdown in GDP can be traced back to services 
and, more specifically, to the wholesale-retail, 
communication and transport sector and to the 
financial services and business activities sector. In 
line with developments in industrial production 
indices, growth in industrial value added picked 
up speed in the fourth quarter, increasing by 
0.7% on the previous quarter.  
Confidence indicators have begun to send 
mixed signals.  
Business confidence indicators have recently 
begun to send somewhat mixed signals. After 
four months of improvement, the Business 
Climate Indicator (BCI) weakened somewhat in 
December, rebounding in January only to suffer 
another modest setback in February (Graph 1). 
The BCI is now back at its long-term average. 
Reuters manufacturing PMI also marked a pause 
in January and February. In the service sector, 
after a rapid and steady improvement between 
March and November 2003, confidence as 
measured by ECFIN surveys has remained stable 
since last December. Reuters PMI for the service 
sector has moved on a very mild downward path 
over the past three months.  
Graph 1: Business confidence, euro area 
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(1) Normalised series. 
Source: Commission services. 
The recent pause in business confidence mainly 
reflects an increase in enterprises’ concerns 
regarding present activity and demand conditions. 
Production expectations have generally remained 
on an upward trend. However, production 
expectations in the manufacturing sector have 
recently fluctuated significantly around this 
upward trend. This is probably an indication of 
some worries regarding the future external value 
of the euro and the timing of the upturn in 
domestic demand.  
In any event, the current level of business 
indicators remains consistent with an expansion 
of production. For instance, Reuters PMI 
Table 2: Selected euro area and national leading indicators, 2003 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI4) Reuters Ser5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 96.2 0.0 2.9 52.2 54.2 95.5 -13.0 43.8 
Trough in latest 
downturn 94.6 -1.2 -3.5 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
May 2003 94.7 -0.66 0.5 46.8 47.9 91.7 -18.3 18.7 
June 2003 94.8 -0.65 1.5 46.4 48.2 93.2 -26.5 21.3 
July 2003 94.7 -0.80 2.8 48.0 50.2 95.2 -19.3 41.9 
August 2003 95.0 -0.47 4.0 49.1 52.0 96.2 -14.3 52.5 
September 2003 95.3 -0.44 5.6 50.1 53.6 98.0 -14.5 60.9 
October 2003 95.6 -0.22 6.5 51.3 56.0 99.8 -10.6 60.3 
November 2003 96.0 0.05 7.0 52.2 57.5 101.0 -8.8 67.2 
December 2003 95.6 -0.02 6.9 52.4 56.6 102.5 -6.9 73.4 
January 2004 96.0 0.11 6.3 52.5 57.3 102.9 -5.6 72.9 
February 2004 96.0 0.01  52.5 56.2 100.4 -6.8 69.9 
March 2004        57.6 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six 
monthly change. 4) Reuters Purchasing managers index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Services purchasing manager index. 6) Business 
expectations, West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market 
analysts, Germany. 
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indicators, in both the manufacturing and the 
service sectors, still stand well above the 50 level 
which separates growth from contraction.  
Graph 2: Consumer confidence, euro area (1)   
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(1) Normalised series. 
Source: Commission services. 
Recent developments in confidence have been 
more upbeat on the consumer side. After 
stagnating in December, household sentiment 
renewed its upward trend in January and 
February. This is quite welcome in a context of 
sluggish private consumption. Nevertheless, the 
improvement in confidence in the past months 
should be put in perspective. It has been 
essentially driven by a more optimistic assessment 
of the general economic situation and receding 
unemployment worries. As shown in Graph 2, 
households have so far reported only limited 
improvements in their personal financial 
situation, a factor which may have weighed on 
their spending decisions.  
Overall, recent confidence indicators point to an 
increase in uncertainty in the euro area which is 
also reflected in the most recent hard data. After 
two months of near stagnation, industrial 
production fell by 0.4% in January relative to the 
month before with year-on-year growth slowing 
to 0.6%. In contrast, data on new orders and on 
retail sales remain quite encouraging. The euro-
area index of industrial new orders increased by 
5.7% in December, with year-on-year growth 
surging to above 13%. Retail sales rose 
significantly in January, with year-on-year growth 
accelerating to 2.4%.  
The recovery remains on track but risks have 
increased 
Despite the recent setback in some economic 
indicators, the recovery is still on track. Reasons 
for cautious optimism can be found both in the 
domestic and in the external sector.  
In the domestic sector, there are early signs that 
the investment cycle has bottomed out, 
suggesting that balance sheets constraints in the 
corporate sector have eased. A turnaround in 
investment is of particular importance in the light 
of the leading role played by this component of 
domestic demand in the current cycle.  
The external sector remains supportive of 
growth. Survey indicators suggest that exports 
will continue to be a source of expansion in the 
next few months, as buoyant world demand more 
than offsets losses in market shares due to 
deteriorating competitiveness. Furthermore, 
although the negative impact of the euro on 
competitiveness and profit margins has been 
visible for some time now, the positive effects of 
the strong euro on households’ purchasing power 
are traditionally slow to materialise and will gain 
in importance in the months to come.   
Finally, monetary and financial conditions remain 
supportive of the economic recovery. Both short-
term and long-term real interest rates are at 
historical lows. Despite the appreciation of the 
euro, monetary conditions are accommodating.  
Graph 3: GDP growth, euro area (1) 
(quarter-on-quarter growth) 
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(1) ECFIN’s indicator-based forecast model.  
Source: Commission services. 
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The outlook is for a continuation of the recovery. 
According to ECFIN’s indicator-based model, 
quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in the euro area 
should be in a range of 0.3% to 0.7% in the first 
quarter of 2004 (see Graph 3). The forecast is 
unchanged compared to the one presented in the 
December Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. 
For the second quarter of 2004, the model 
predicts the same range of 0.3% to 0.7%.  
While there continues to be both upside and 
downside risks to the short-term outlook, recent 
developments suggest that downside risks may 
have increased.  
Upside risks include a stronger-than-expected 
expansion of world demand and the possible 
release of some pent-up demand in the euro area 
following a long period of sluggish growth in 
domestic spending.  
Some downside risks are attached to the 
sustainability of the US recovery. US growth has 
been partly fuelled by an extraordinarily large 
policy impulse whose impact will fade. Another 
source of downside risks relates to the possibility 
of a further sharp appreciation of the euro that 
would push the external value of the currency 
significantly above its equilibrium value.  
On the domestic side, balance sheet pressures 
have eased off but there may still be a need for 
further corporate adjustment. More critically, 
there is still significant uncertainty as to the 
timing of the recovery in consumer spending. In 
this regard, the impact of the recent terrorist 
attacks in Madrid is difficult to assess at this 
juncture and will have to be monitored carefully 
in the months ahead.  
Further evidence of solid growth in the world 
economy  
The US economy continues to be one of the 
main engines of the world economy. Growth 
reached 3.1% in 2003 on the back of a strong 
performance during the second half of the year. 
The expansion of the US economy has been 
much helped by an accommodative monetary 
policy and a marked fiscal expansion, although at 
the cost of a very sharp deterioration of public 
finances. In addition, persistently strong 
productivity gains have facilitated balance sheet 
improvements in the corporate sector, allowing a 
rapid rise in profit margins and underpinning the 
recovery of business investment. Short-term 
growth prospects appear solid although the 
economy’s internal and external balances are still 
a cause for concern where the medium-term 
sustainability of growth is concerned.  
In Japan, a recovery has taken place since the 
second quarter of 2002. In the first three quarters 
of 2003, the economy expanded by an average 
annualised 2.7%. Growth accelerated markedly in 
the fourth quarter to an annualised rate of 6.4%, 
a performance unmatched since the early 1990s. 
The recovery is also becoming more broad-based 
with households, the corporate sector and trade 
all contributing positively to growth in the last 
quarter. Leading indicators and confidence 
surveys signal a continuation of the upturn in 
2004. Better prospects for Japan’s key exports 
markets, particularly in Asia, and renewed 
strength in domestic demand are behind this 
positive development.  
The recovery of the world economy is also 
underpinned by robust growth in emerging 
markets. The rapid expansion of emerging Asian 
economies, spearheaded by the strong 
performance of the Chinese and Indian 
economies, shows no signs of abating. The 
recovery has so far been more subdued in Latin 
America but the region’s short-term prospects are 
improving on the back of strong US growth and 
improved investor sentiment towards emerging 
markets. Finally, countries joining the EU have 
succeeded relatively well in withstanding sluggish 
activity in the euro area, their main trading 
partner. Partly thanks to ongoing structural 
reforms and strong domestic demand, activity in 
acceding countries has picked up speed, with 
GDP growth accelerating from 2.5% in 2002 to 
an estimated 3.6% in 2003. 
The strength of the world economy is reflected in 
estimates of world trade. According to the 
indicator constructed by the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, world 
imports have rebounded strongly since last 
summer and were growing in real terms by over 
10% y-o-y in December last year.  
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Graph 4: World imports 
(year-on-year % changes in volume) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
The strong euro is weighing on 
competitiveness but trade remains supportive  
Euro-area exporters have been exposed to a 
considerable loss in price competitiveness during 
the past two years. Since its trough in October 
2000, the real effective exchange rate of the euro 
has appreciated by 24 to 29% depending on the 
price indicator considered. Nevertheless, the 
appreciation should be put in perspective: 
depending on the real exchange rate concept 
used, the euro is currently only between 1 and 7% 
above its average value over the past 30 years. 
Furthermore, the negative competitiveness 
impact of a stronger euro has so far been largely 
offset by a brisk recovery of world trade.  
National account data show a strong negative 
contribution of net trade in the fourth quarter of 
2003 but this result should be put in perspective.  
• First, weak export growth had probably 
more to do with the correction of an 
excessive rebound in exports in the third 
quarter than with the negative effect of 
losses in competitiveness.2  
• Second, ECFIN’s manufacturing survey has 
so far continued to display strong readings 
in terms of export expectations. As shown 
                                                     
2  On the basis of developments in the real effective 
exchange rate and world demand, the export equation 
presented in the Focus Section of the present report 
predicts, respectively, slower and faster export growth 
than actually observed in the third and the fourth quarters.  
in Graph 5, manufacturers have reported a 
sharp deterioration in competitiveness in the 
past months. However, export expectations 
strengthened markedly in the fourth quarter 
of 2003 and edged up slightly further in the 
first months of 2004. Interestingly, this 
optimistic picture of export orders holds 
even for those industrial branches which are 
said to be more vulnerable to variations in 
the euro/US dollar exchange rate such as 
equipment goods.  
• Third, the negative contribution of trade to 
GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2003 
was magnified by a surge in imports which 
partly reflects the strong build-up of 
inventories.  
Graph 5: Exports in manufacturing surveys  
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Source: Commission services. 
As analysed in detail in the Focus Section of this 
report, several factors have contributed to 
dampening the response of euro-area 
manufacturers to the appreciation of the euro. 
First, exporters have squeezed their profit 
margins to contain losses in price 
competitiveness. This is reflected in a sharp 
deceleration of export prices. Second, although 
changes in competitiveness do matter for the 
export performance of euro-area companies, they 
tend to matter much less than changes in world 
demand. There is some evidence that euro-area 
exporter are specialised in products which are 
more sensitive to changes in income than to 
changes in prices. Finally, empirical analyses 
suggest that, although changes in exchange rates 
do impinge on enterprises’ expectations, there is 
no evidence that they lead to excessive 
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confidence reactions (overshooting) that could 
amplify the direct impact of a strengthening 
currency on activity.  
The sustainability of the recovery hinges on a 
pick-up of domestic demand 
Whereas, historically, a standard feature of the 
euro-area business cycle is a strong contribution 
of exports in the early stage of a recovery, the 
sustainability of the ongoing upswing hinges on a 
gradual pick-up of domestic demand during the 
course of 2004. In this respect, the recent signs of 
a pick-up in investment are encouraging although 
the outlook for private consumption remains 
surrounded by substantial uncertainty.  
Graph 6: Investment growth, euro area  
(non-annualised q-o-q changes in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Recent developments suggest that the investment 
slump is coming to an end. After a progressive 
slowdown in the speed of contraction in the 
second and third quarters, investment increased 
by 0.6% quarter-on-quarter in the last quarter of 
2003. The rebound appears broad-based in the 
sense that it is observable in most of the Member 
States for which data are available. Furthermore, 
it is not just a result of an upsurge in residential 
construction. The information available on the 
breakdown of investment by branches in some 
Member States indicates that productive and 
equipment investment both increased in the 
fourth quarter. Although corporate debt levels 
remain high, the observed pick-up in corporate 
spending supports the idea that that balance sheet 
constraints in the corporate sector have eased. 
The scenario of a gradual firming of investment is 
also in line with the surge in industrial new orders 
registered in December in the electronic and 
transport equipment sectors.  
In contrast, recent developments in consumer 
spending have been disappointing. Private 
consumption increased by 0.1% in the fourth 
quarter, a further marginal slowing from the mere 
0.2% growth registered in the previous quarter. 
Although Germany, which reported its fourth 
successive contraction in consumption, weighed 
on the euro-area performance, the sluggishness of 
household spending was broad-based. Excluding 
Germany, quarter-on-quarter growth in euro-area 
consumption slowed from 0.4% in the third 
quarter to 0.3% in the fourth quarter.  
Recent developments in private consumption 
partly reflect sluggish growth in disposable 
income as wage income has been constrained by 
stagnating employment. Furthermore, inflation 
proved to be stickier than expected in 2003, 
limiting household gains in purchasing power. 
Whilst the strong euro has entailed noticeable 
gains in the terms of trade, these gains have so far 
been slow to materialise at the final consumption 
level. The pass-through of exchange fluctuations 
into import prices is relatively fast in the euro 
area but its speed decreases along the production 
chain and tends to be slow for consumer prices, 
with estimated lags of up to three years.  
In addition to weak developments in disposable 
income, and as discussed in more details in 
Section 2 below, the sluggishness of household 
spending in 2003 may also reflect the lagged 
impact of the bursting of the equity price bubble. 
Nevertheless, private consumption appears to be, 
at this juncture, somewhat weaker than what 
could be expected on the basis of traditional 
macroeconomic determinants. This excessive 
weakness may in part reflect ongoing distortions 
in perceived inflation. It may also be a 
consequence of negative confidence effects 
linked to deteriorating public finances in some 
Member States as well as concerns related to the 
sustainability of pension systems and the slow 
progress of structural reforms. Hence, although 
the outlook remains for a gradual recovery in 
consumer spending throughout 2004, the 
strength and the timing of the revival of private 
consumption is surrounded by substantial 
uncertainty.  
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The recent terrorist attacks in Madrid have only 
added to the uncertainty surrounding consumer 
spending. No data are yet available on the impact 
of these events on household confidence in the 
euro area. Given the global nature of the terrorist 
threat, possible consequences may not be 
restricted to Spain. On the other hand, the US 
experience suggests that terrorist attacks may 
have only a transitory impact on confidence 
indicators and only very limited impact on 
consumer spending.  
The recent drop in inflation mainly reflects 
base effects  
Headline inflation has dropped in the past two 
months. It fell marginally from 2.0% in 
December 2003 to 1.9% in January 2004 and 
more substantially to 1.6% in February. The 
decrease is largely attributable to a strong base 
effect in the energy component and the 
continued unwinding of temporarily high 
inflation in unprocessed food. The deceleration 
of inflation in these two sectors more than offset 
the unfavourable effects of price increases in the 
health sector and hikes in indirect taxes. The base 
effect in the energy component is a consequence 
of the sharp rises in oil prices registered early last 
year before the start of the war against Iraq. It is 
estimated to have continued to exert strong 
downward pressure on annual inflation rates in 
March but is likely to fade later on in the spring, 
as energy price inflation last year declined rather 
sharply after the start of the war against Iraq. 
Recent developments in core inflation continue 
to point to some underlying stickiness. Growth in 
HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy 
remained unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in 
January 2004 before edging slightly up to 2.0% in 
February. The weighted median, an alternative 
measure of core inflation that has the property of 
letting the data decide which extreme price 
variations are excluded each month, was for the 
sixth consecutive month unchanged at 1.9% y-o-
y in February 2004.  
Since it is mainly base effects in the most volatile 
components of HICP inflation that are exerting 
downward pressure on the headline rate, core 
inflation is likely to show much less volatility and 
only decrease gradually in the months ahead in 
response to the still relatively subdued demand 
conditions, a pick-up in productivity and the past 
appreciation of the euro.  
Graph 7: Inflation in the euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
Labour market remarkably resilient  
Employment has remained largely stable in the 
euro area since the second quarter of 2002 and 
business surveys do not suggest any significant 
strengthening of the labour market in the 
opening months of 2004. ECFIN’s surveys paint 
a moderately upbeat picture: after a softening at 
the end of 2003, enterprises reported 
improvements in the employment outlook in 
January and February both in the manufacturing 
and in the service sectors. However these 
developments should be interpreted with caution 
as recent readings of employment in Reuters 
surveys have been less encouraging, pointing to a 
deterioration of employment, in particular in the 
service sector.   
Despite the overall stagnation of employment in 
the past year, it is important to stress the 
remarkable overall resilience of the labour market 
in the current downturn. The unemployment rate 
has remained stable at 8.8% since March last year. 
It remained on a downward trend during the 
early stages of the downturn in 2001 and is now 
only 0.6 percentage point above its level at the 
peak of the cycle at the end of 2000. Such an 
increase is quite muted compared with the 
deterioration observed during the recession of 
the early 1990s. Whereas the two cyclical 
downswings have given rise to similar levels of 
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deterioration in the output gap, the 
unemployment rate increased by more than 2 
percentage points between the end of 1991 and 
the end of 1994.  
There are some preliminary signs that this 
increased cyclical resilience of employment has 
begun to be acknowledged by households. 
Between spring 2001 and spring 2003, concerns 
related to unemployment in household surveys 
rose rapidly and more sharply than would have 
been warranted by the observed deterioration in 
unemployment. However, since last June, 
households’ assessment of employment prospects 
has improved rapidly, despite a stagnating 
unemployment rate. The trend can probably be 
interpreted as a correction to an overly 
pessimistic appraisal of the unemployment 
outlook in the early stages of the downturn.  
The mirror image of the relative resilience of the 
labour market in the latest downturn has been 
sluggish growth in labour productivity. The euro-
area’s productivity performance was particularly 
weak by historical standards in 2001. It recovered 
somewhat in 2002, before stalling again at the 
end of 2002 and during the first half of 2003. The 
pick-up in activity in the third quarter of 2003 
was accompanied by a slight acceleration of 
productivity (no data as yet available for the 
fourth quarter).  
Graph 8: Labour productivity, real wages and profit 
margins, euro area  
(q-o-q growth unless otherwise specified) 
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(1) Inverted real unit labour costs – index 2000=100 
Source: Commission services. 
In terms of profitability, these positive 
productivity developments have been accentuated 
by muted progress in real wages. Reversing three 
quarters of steady deterioration, profit margins 
(as measured by real unit labour costs) rose in the 
third quarter (see Graph 8). However, the 
aggregate positive picture for profitability 
conceals major sectoral disparities. Sectoral data 
available on a quarterly basis suggest that further 
profitability adjustments would be necessary in 
the manufacturing industry and in the broad retail 
transport and communication sector.3 
Monetary and financial conditions are 
supportive 
ECFIN’s monetary conditions index (MCI) 
suggests that monetary conditions in the euro 
were tightened somewhat in the last quarter of 
2003 but remain accommodative.4  
Graph 9: Monetary conditions in the euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
The MCI increased in the final months of 2003, 
as record low real short-term interest rates did 
not fully offset the appreciation of the euro real 
exchange rate. It then remained broadly stable in 
January and February. Although there are no 
MCI data as yet available for March, a slight 
loosening of monetary conditions may have taken 
place that month on the back of a weakening of 
the exchange rate. After reaching a peak of close 
                                                     
3  Quarterly national accounts for the euro area provide 
some sectoral data for 6 broad sectors. 
4 The MCI tries to capture the combined impact on 
economic activity of changes in the real effective exchange 
rate and the real short-term interest rate.  
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to US$ 1.29 in mid-February, the euro eased 
subsequently somewhat against the dollar. Mid-
March, the euro was trading at about US$1.23. 
Graph 10: Stock prices and long-term interest rates,  
euro area (Index = 0 in Jan 1999 - Inverted scale) 
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Source: Commission services. 
There has been a further improvement in long-
term financing conditions in the past months. 
After reaching a peak in mid-November last year, 
long-term government bond yields have remained 
on a moderate downward slope in the past few 
months. Mid-March 2004, yields on euro-area 10-
year bonds were about 60 basis points lower than 
4 months earlier. The decrease reflects a shift in 
market participants’ expectations in terms of 
short-term interest rates, with the next tightening 
of monetary policy now expected to take place 
later than initially anticipated. Some 
disappointment with recently released economic 
data and concerns about the impact of the euro 
appreciation on activity both seem to have 
contributed to the shift in expectations. In 
addition, developments in the break-even 
inflation rate suggest that market participants’ 
long-term inflation expectations have decreased 
slightly in the euro area over the last few months. 
Financing conditions in the private sector have 
also benefited from a loosening of credit standard 
in the banking sector. The ECB’s latest bank 
lending survey points to a continued fall in the 
share of banks reporting a tightening of corporate 
credit standards. In the meantime, the share of 
banks reporting a tightening of household credit 
standards has remained low.  
Stock prices have been on a clear upward trend 
since March 2003, recouping about a quarter of 
the losses incurred since the bursting of the 
equity bubble in 2000. Mid-march 2004, despite a 
significant drop in the wake of the Madrid 
terrorist attacks, euro-area equity prices, as 
measured by the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 
index, were trading 50% above their low of a year 
before. In the past few months, equity markets 
have been supported by declining long-term 
interest rate and good corporate earnings 
announcements.  
2. Explaining the weakness of private 
consumption in the euro area 
Recent developments in private consumption 
Developments in private consumption have been 
somewhat disappointing over the past three 
years. After an episode of contraction towards 
the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, real 
private consumption picked up speed in 2002. It 
expanded by 1-1.5% in annualised terms until the 
first quarter of 2003 and became the major and 
almost sole source of growth in the euro area 
over this period. However, household spending 
has stalled again since spring 2003, growing by 
less than 0.5% in average annualised terms during 
the last three quarters of last year.  
Graph 11: Growth in real private consumption,  
euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Graph 12 shows growth in real disposable 
income and developments in the euro-area saving 
rate. Given that Eurostat does not yet provide 
quarterly household disposable income data for 
the euro area as a whole, the series used is based 
on estimates taken from the Area-Wide Model 
dataset built by Fagan et al (2001).5, 6  
Graph 12: Households’ real disposable income and  
saving rate, euro area 
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(1) as a share of household disposable income.  
Source: Fagan et al. (2001) and Commission services. 
Two conclusions are suggested by the graph. 
First, given that disposable income has 
traditionally played an important role in 
explaining consumption behaviour, the main 
explanation for the weakness of private 
consumption in the latest downturn is likely to be 
sluggish growth in real disposable income. 
Second, the subdued performance of private 
consumption may well have been aggravated by 
adverse developments in saving behaviour. A 
significant rise in the household savings rate took 
place in the second half of 2000 and in 2001. 
After a modest decline in 2002, the savings rate 
edged slightly up again in 2003. Furthermore, 
developments in households’ savings behaviour 
in the past three years stand in sharp contrast to 
the continuous decrease in the savings ratio 
registered during most of the previous decade. 
This past decrease added about 0.8 of a 
                                                     
5  Fagan, G., Henry J. and R. Mestre (2001), ‘An area-wide 
model (AWM) for the euro area’, ECB Working Paper No. 
42, January.  
6  The AWM dataset only includes data up to 2002. 
Estimates for the first three quarters of 2003 were 
constructed at DG ECFIN on the basis of data available 
at the Member States’ level. 
percentage point to annual growth in 
consumption during the second half of the 1990s.  
A comparison with the 1992-93 recession.  
It is interesting to put the weakness of private 
consumption in perspective by comparing 
present cyclical developments with the recession 
of the early 1990s.  
Graph 13: Household consumption in cyclical 
downturns, euro area (index 100 in Q0) 
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2001-03 downturn) 
Source: Commission services. 
As shown in Graph 13, household consumption 
was slightly more resilient during the 2001-03 
downturn than between 1992 and 1994. The 
deterioration in the output gap was similar over 
the two periods. In average annual terms, private 
consumption increased by 0.9% between 2000Q4 
and 2003Q4 and by only 0.6% during a period of 
similar length in the 1992-1994 downturn. 
However, the relatively stronger consumption in 
the latest downturn is a feature of the early stages 
of the downturn. The growth performance of 
consumption is considerably more sluggish in the 
third year of the latest downswing than in the 
same period of the downturn in the 1990s.  
In terms of the labour market, the difference 
between the two cyclical downswings is striking. 
Wage and income developments were 
significantly less supportive of private 
consumption between 1992 and 1994 than 
between 2001 and 2003. Average annual growth 
in wage income was slightly negative during the 
former period and largely positive during the 
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latter. The difference is entirely attributable to 
more resilient employment whereas progress in 
real wages was significantly faster during the 
1992-94 period. Developments in non-wage 
income were also more favourable in the 2001-03 
downturn.  
Table 3: Income developments in the 1992-94 
and 2001-03 downturns, euro area  
(annual average growth in %) 
 1992-94 (1) 2001-03 (2) 
Employment -0.8 0.4 
Real wage rate 0.8 0.4 
Real wage income (3) -0.1 0.8 
Real disposable income  -0.4 0.8 
Private consumption 0.5 0.9 
(1) 1992:1 to 1994:4. 
(2) 2001:1 to 2003:3. 
(3) Growth in real wage income is the sum of growth in the real 
wage rate and growth in employment. 
Source: Commission services and Fagan et al. (2001). 
 
 
There are also important differences between the 
two cyclical episodes in terms of savings 
behaviour. In the recession of the early 1990s, 
households partly offset adverse developments in 
disposable income by curbing their savings rate. 
In contrast, they have displayed a much more 
cautious savings behaviour since 2000. To give an 
idea of the order of magnitude involved, a saving 
pattern similar to the one observed in the early 
1990s would have boosted consumption growth 
by half a percentage point per year in the 2001-03 
downturn.  
Graph 14: Household saving rate in cyclical downturns, 
euro area (in % of disposable income) 
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Q0 corresponds to the peak preceding the beginning of the 
downturn (92 Q1 for the 1992-93 recession and 2000 Q4 for the 
2001-03 downturn) 
Source: Fagan et al. (2001) and Commission services. 
Current sources of consumption weakness 
In order to better understand recent 
developments in household spending, a 
consumption function was estimated (see details 
in Box 1). The function relates quarterly private 
consumption in the euro area to a number of 
traditional macroeconomic determinants, 
including disposable income, equity wealth, 
inflation, interest rates and the unemployment 
rate.  
Graph 15: Household actual and simulated 
consumption, euro area (in billion of 1995 euro) 
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(1) As simulated with the consumption function over 1995-2003. 
Source: Commission services. 
The estimated equation explains actual 
developments in consumption over the 1990s 
quite well, including the 1992-93 recession. 
However, it clearly performs less well after the 
turn of the decade. As shown in Graph 15, 
household spending has remained below what is 
predicted by the equation since 2001. The gap 
was established essentially during the second half 
of 2001 and the first half of 2002. Subsequently, 
it narrowed somewhat before widening slightly 
again in the second half of 2003. Overall, the 
consumption function suggests that the level of 
private consumption is currently somewhat 
weaker – by about 0.7% – than what would be 
expected given the prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions.
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Box 1: Estimating a consumption function for the euro area 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the factors which have weighed on household spending in the last few 
years, a consumption function was estimated using euro-area quarterly time series. From among the several 
specifications tested, a so-called error correction model provided the most satisfying results. The estimated 
consumption function is composed of two elements. The long-term equation relates the level of real private 
consumption to selected long-term determinants. The short-term dynamics links quarter on quarter growth in real 
private consumption to a few variables and the lagged deviation of consumption from its long-term value (the so-
called error correction term). In such a framework, consumption can deviate from the value dictated by the long-
term relation only temporarily, since a deviation at any point in time will lead to a correction in the ensuing periods.  
Households decide on spending/saving on the basis of their present and future disposable income but also their 
wealth, the relative prices of present and future consumption and the uncertainty surrounding the future stream of 
income. The determinants of private consumption in the long-run equation include disposable income, stock prices 
(as a proxy for wealth), real short-term interest rates and inflation (as a proxy for the uncertainty as to the real 
depreciation of non-indexed financial assets). Other potential determinants such as real long-term interest rates, 
unemployment and residential property prices were also tested, but their contributions were not found to be 
econometrically meaningful. The elasticities are presented in the left-hand panel of the table below. The variables in 
the long-run equation are all non-stationary. Johansen’s approach was used to test for cointegration and to estimate 
the equation.   
 
The estimated parameters in the short-term dynamics are displayed in the right-hand panel of the table. Only 
disposable income, the real long-term interest rate and unemployment were found to be significant. The short-term 
equation explains close to 70% of the variance in quarter-on-quarter growth in consumption, a fit which is 
relatively good for this type of specification. The fit of the equation is good for the 1990s. The equation performs 
less well after the year 2000.  
 
A consumption function for the euro area 
Main estimation results 
Long-term elasticities (1) Short-term dynamics (1) (2) 
Variable  Elasticity Variable Coefficient 
Disposable income 1.052 Disposable income (q-o-q growth) 0.523 
Stock prices 0.024 Change in real long-term interest rate (3) -0.002 
Real short-term interest rates -0.004 Change in unemployment rate (4) -0.011 
Inflation rate -0.006 Error-correction term -0.199 
  Constant 0.003 
 R_squared 0.67  Durbin Watson 2.09 
(1) All elasticities/coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Estimation sample is 1987:Q2 to 2003:Q3 (quarterly data). 
(2) Endogenous variable (private consumption) is expressed in q-o-q growth.  
(3) Lagged by two quarters.  
(4) Second differences. 
Source: Commission services – disposable income data based on Fagan et al. (2001). 
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Main messages from the consumption function. The 
estimated consumption function can be used to 
assess the sources of consumption weakness in 
recent years. Table 4 displays the contribution of 
the main determinants of consumption to the 
changes in consumption over the 2000-03 period, 
as simulated using the fitted equation. Several 
points are worth highlighting:  
• According to the equation, consumption 
growth should have decelerated modestly in 
2001, when it actually slowed substantially.  
• In 2002-03, the equation ascribes the 
weakening of consumption mainly to the 
deceleration of disposable income and the 
bursting of the equity bubble. As in 2001, a 
non-negligible part of the consumption 
slowdown remains unexplained in 2002.  
• In addition to its direct impact on real 
purchasing power, the rise in inflation 
weighed somewhat on household spending 
in 2001 and 2002. In contrast, the cut in 
short-term interest rates provided some 
support for consumption in 2002 and 2003.  
Overall, the estimated equation attributes an 
important role to stock market wealth effects in 
the current cycle. Private consumption would 
have been significantly less buoyant in the late 
1990s and more resilient in the ensuing downturn 
in the absence of stock market gyrations. 
Furthermore, given the long lags involved, 
negative stock market wealth effects were still 
weighing on consumption during the second half 
of 2003 despite a pick-up in stock prices. 
Nevertheless, two factors suggest that these 
results should be interpreted with caution. First, 
although the estimated long-term impact of stock 
prices on consumer spending is in line with the 
existing empirical literature, it is somewhat on the 
high side.7 Second, the consumption function 
may overestimate the negative wealth effect 
incurred since 2000, because it only takes into 
account developments in stock prices. Total 
household wealth also includes other forms of 
financial wealth, as well as residential property. In 
recent years, the prices of these latter two 
categories of wealth have tended to fare much 
better than the prices of quoted shares.  
Graph 16: Households financial assets, euro area 
(% annual changes in real terms) 
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(1) Euro area excluding EL, FR, IE, LU.  
(2) EU-8 + FR. No data available for 2002. 
Source: Commission services. 
According to Eurostat data, households’ total 
financial assets decreased by 3% in 2001 in the 
                                                     
7  According to the estimation, a 10% drop in stock prices 
entails a long-run fall in consumption of 0.25%. Boone et 
al. find an elasticity of less than 0.2% for continental 
Europe (Boone, L., Giorno, C. and P. Richardson (1998), 
‘Stock market fluctuations and consumption behaviour: 
some recent evidence’, OECD Working Paper No. 208).  
 
Table 4: Contributions to annual growth in private consumption 2000-03, euro-area  
(as predicted by the consumption equation) 
Total consumption growth  Disposable 
income 
Stock 
prices 
Inflation Long-term 
real interest 
rate 
Short-term 
real interest 
rate 
Unempl. 
rate As explained 
by equation 
Actual 
2000 2.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.4  0.2 -0.1 2.5 2.7 
2001 2.3 0.2 -0.3  0.1 -0.1 -0.2 2.2 1.7 
2002 1.3 -0.3 -0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0 1.0 0.1 
2003 0.9 -0.6  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2 0.7 1.0 
Source: Commission services. 
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euro area (see Graph 16). Preliminary data point 
to a further contraction of about 5% in 2002. 
Hence, the contraction in total financial wealth 
over the past few years has remained fairly 
subdued relative to the collapse in equity prices 
which, based on annual averages, fell respectively 
by 20% and 25% in 2001 and 2002. In the 
meantime, property wealth is likely to have 
increased significantly. As shown in Graph 17, 
growth in residential property prices picked up 
speed in the 2001-03 downturn, reaching close to 
5% in real terms in the last two years. Overall, 
although no national account data are available 
for households’ property wealth, there is some 
evidence that losses in households’ total wealth 
have remained limited since 2000.  
Graph 17: Residential property prices, euro area 
(% annual changes in real terms (1) – all dwellings) 
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Source: ECB and Commission services. 
Due to a lack of adequate data at the quarterly 
level, the estimated consumption function does 
not include property wealth or non-equity 
financial wealth effects. Reliance on stock prices 
as the only proxy for wealth may therefore have 
led to an overestimation of the negative impact of 
wealth effects in the 2001-03 downturn. A major 
implication is that recent consumption 
developments may have been even more subdued 
relative to the prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions than suggested by the estimated 
consumption function. Additional possible 
sources of spending weakness, which could not 
be captured in the equation,8 include household 
debt constraints, deteriorating public finances, 
demographic ageing, distortions in perceived 
inflation and low confidence. These possible 
factors are discussed below. 
Debt constraints. Although household debt 
increased substantially during the second half of 
the 1990s, the overall level of household 
indebtedness remains rather low in the euro area 
relative to other OECD countries. The risk that 
debt might act as a constraint on spending 
appears low at this juncture.9 Mortgage debt, 
which accounts for more than two thirds of 
household debt, has expanded by 6-7% annually 
in the past three years. This pace of growth does 
not signal significant debt constraints.  
Deteriorating public finances. Budgetary policy has 
tended to be moderately counter-cyclical in the 
early stages of the downturn. However, in some 
Member States the loosening of fiscal policy has 
led to excessive deficits which may have weighed 
on consumer confidence and willingness to 
spend. More generally, income tax cuts enacted in 
most Member States may have been met with 
more cautious spending behaviours. At least, 
there is no evidence that they stimulated 
consumer spending as had been hoped for. 
The possibility of such non-Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy is in line with the fact that much of 
the decoupling between actual and simulated 
private consumption, as discussed in the previous 
section, took place in 2001 and 2002. It is further 
supported by developments in saving behaviour 
in those countries for which the information is 
available.10 Nearly all countries that loosened 
budgetary policy in the downturn have also 
experienced an increase in the savings ratio. The 
only exception to this rule is Finland which 
enjoys a comfortable fiscal surplus and where a 
deterioration of public finances may have been 
                                                     
8  This may be due to inadequate data. It can also reflect the 
fact that these variables do not generally affect consumer 
spending substantially but have gained in importance in 
recent years.  
9  See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area No III/2003. 
10  Annual data on savings are currently available for all euro-
area Member States except EL, IE, LU and PT. 
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perceived as not worrying by households. Of the 
three countries that have tightened budgetary 
policy in recent years and for which saving data 
are available, two have enjoyed a decline in the 
household savings rate.  
Demographic ageing. Although the direct impact of 
population ageing on spending patterns is very 
gradual, increasing awareness of upcoming 
related pressures on pension systems may have 
induced households to raise precautionary 
savings. The importance of such a factor is 
unfortunately difficult to assess at this stage. 
Distortions in perceived inflation. The euro 
changeover has been associated with a rising gap 
between inflation developments and their 
perception by households. Such a distortion in 
inflation perceptions might have led households 
to underestimate their purchasing power. 
However, its importance as a source of 
consumption weakness should not be 
overestimated. It is worth noting that much of 
the increase in the households’ savings rate took 
place in 2001, i.e. before the euro changeover. 
Furthermore, the gap between actual inflation 
and its perception by households narrowed 
significantly during the first half of 2003 without 
triggering a noticeable release of pent-up demand.  
Weak consumer confidence. Household sentiment has 
improved gradually since spring 2003. However, 
the overall measure of consumer confidence 
provided by ECFIN surveys is forward looking in 
the sense that it is an average of consumers’ 
answers to several questions on their own and the 
general economic situation over the next 12 
months. In contrast, backward looking indicators 
in consumer surveys have improved more 
modestly (see Graph 18), suggesting that 
households still have a fairly pessimistic view of 
their present situation.  
It is also to be noted that households’ assessment 
of their present and past situation bottomed out 
in spring 2003 at levels which were comparable to 
the lows reached during the 1992-93 recession.11 
Hence, the fairly resilient labour market and more 
supportive developments in disposable income 
                                                     
11  Households’ assessment of their financial situation even 
bottomed out at a lower level in 2003 than in 1993.  
have not led households to rate the 2001-03 
downturn as less painful than its 1992-93 
predecessor. Furthermore, the ongoing recovery 
of backward looking indicators of consumer 
sentiment appears slow relative to similar stages 
of the confidence cycles of the 1990s.  
Graph 18: Consumer confidence (1), euro area 
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(1)Normalised data.  
(2) Average of three backward looking indicators of household 
sentiment in ECFIN survey (personal financial situation, general 
economic situation and major purchases). 
(3) Overall confidence indicator in ECFIN’s consumer survey.  
Source: Commission services. 
Overall, a careful analysis of confidence surveys 
shows that the factors currently restraining 
confidence have probably more to do with 
households’ personal financial situation (present 
and, to a lesser, degree future) than with their 
concerns related to unemployment or to the 
general economic situation, both of which have 
eased significantly in the past months. This could 
be a further indication that deteriorating public 
finances and increasing worries related to the 
effect of demographic ageing on pensions have 
taken their toll on consumer spending.  
Finally, household confidence may also be 
hampered by the uncertainty surrounding the 
structural reform process. Slow progress and 
backtracking in the implementation of agreed 
reforms means that the beneficial effects of 
reforms are slow to materialise while the 
uncertainties on the economic environment are 
maximised. 
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Concluding remarks 
The analysis presented in this section shows that 
developments in private consumption in the euro 
area are generally well explained by traditional 
macroeconomic determinants of consumption 
including disposable income, stock prices, 
inflation and interest rates. Nevertheless, 
consumption is currently somewhat weaker than 
predicted on the basis of an estimated 
consumption function.  
The prevailing subdued level of private 
consumption, relative to what might be expected 
according to traditional macroeconomic 
determinants of consumption, is mirrored in the 
slow speed of recovery of some household 
confidence indicators. This could be partly 
explained by distortions in perceived inflation, 
but it probably also reflects concerns related to 
the deterioration of public finances, to the 
increasing awareness of the challenges posed by 
population ageing and, more generally, to the 
uncertainty generated by the very slow progress 
with structural reforms. 
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Focus 
II. The impact of the euro appreciation on economic activity 
After a prolonged period of weakness, the external value of the euro has returned to a level more in line with estimates of its 
equilibrium value. In historical perspective, the current level is slightly above the long-term average in real effective terms. As 
an immediate effect of the appreciation, exporters have suffered from a significant loss in international price competitiveness 
compared with the euro trough in 2000. However, the sensitivity of extra-area exports to variations in exchange rates is 
relatively small in comparison with the impact of developments in world import demand. At the current juncture, it is likely 
that the rebound in world trade more than offsets the impact of the loss in price competitiveness. A second important 
potential effect of the appreciation on the economy is related to the impact of lower import prices on domestic inflation and on 
purchasing power. In line with lags observed in the past, domestic prices have so far been slow to respond to changes in 
import prices. However, the benefits of the strong euro to the consumer should materialise in the near future. Overall, the 
impact on economic activity of an appreciation, when following a previous depreciation, can be modest. 
1. Introduction 
The present Focus Section analyses the impact of 
the appreciation of the euro on the euro-area 
economy. Changes in exchange rates can affect 
economic activity through a number of channels, 
of which the four most important are: 
• Price competitiveness. An appreciating currency 
implies a loss in international price 
competitiveness. Exporters lose market 
shares on international markets unless they 
are able to hold prices in foreign currency 
constant by squeezing profit margins.  
• Terms of trade. Prices of imported consumer 
goods and intermediate goods decline, which 
entails an increase in domestic purchasing 
power, which in turn may strengthen 
domestic demand.  
• Domestic capital costs. Capital inflows may 
increase if the appreciation is caused by a 
shift in preferences towards holding domestic 
rather than foreign assets, leading to reduced 
domestic capital costs. 
• Profitability. An appreciation weighs on 
corporate profits either because exporters 
partly restore competitiveness by reducing 
prices in euro or because the appreciation 
reduces the profit stream from foreign 
subsidiaries. Lower profits can in turn affect 
investment.  
After a first section, aimed at putting the current 
value of the euro in a historical perspective, these 
channels are discussed successively. A final 
section presents model simulations of the overall 
impact of the appreciation on growth in the euro 
area.  
2. The euro in historical perspective  
Since the beginning of 2003, the euro has risen 
from a little over parity against the dollar ($1.04) 
to a value around $1.23 in the first half of March 
2004 – an appreciation of close to 18%. In a 
more long-term perspective, the euro is currently 
around 12% above its average value against the 
dollar of 1.10 during the period 1980-2003. The 
euro remains 6% below its value in 1995 and still 
about 15% below its twenty-five year high point 
of 1.44 recorded in January 1980. 
Graph 19: Nominal effective exchange rate of the euro  
(Monthly data, 1980-2003=100) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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While public attention usually focuses on the 
bilateral exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis the 
USD, effective exchange rates are more 
informative than bilateral exchange rates for 
assessing the impact on economic activity. Real 
effective exchange rates (REER) are particularly 
meaningful because they control for differences 
in inflation among trading partners. 
Table 5: Variation in the euro’s real effective 
exchange rate (REER) for various deflators  
(based on monthly values) 
 
Jan-1999 / 
Oct-2000 
Oct-2000/ 
Feb-2004 
Feb-2003/ 
Feb-2004 
GDP deflator - 25.2 29.5 6.5 
Consumer prices - 23.8 29.7 6.7 
Export prices - 20.9 24.7 4.6 
Unit labour costs,  - 26.6 30.4 6.6 
Memorandum items 
NEER -20.5 31.1 6.9 
USD/EUR -35.7 47.5 17.3 
Note: A + indicates an appreciation. In order to facilitate 
comparison with the subsequent rebound the change is calculated in 
% of the trough, i.e. the inverse of the usual notation for the first 
column. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Depending on the deflator chosen, REERs fell 
between 20 and 27 % between January 1999 and 
October 2000 and have appreciated by 25 to 
30 % since then. In all cases, the REER indicates 
that price competitiveness is currently less 
favourable than when the euro was launched. 
A comparison of the recent REER with long-
term averages gives a more reliable picture than 
the (implicit) comparison with its launch value in 
1999, for which there is no evidence that it could 
be considered an equilibrium value. Graph 20 
relates the euro-area REER to the 1974-2003 
average. The graph shows that the current REER 
of the euro area exceeds its long-term average by 
a relatively narrow margin of about 1 to 7% 
depending on the concept considered. In 
addition, Commission estimates suggest that the 
euro-area REER is close to its equilibrium rate. 
The magnitude of the deviation between the 
actual real effective exchange rate and an estimate 
of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
(FEER) is small, both relative to past deviations 
and relative to the margin of uncertainty that 
surrounds any estimation of equilibrium 
exchange rates. 
Graph 20: Euro-area real effective exchange rate 
(synthetic euro before 1999, relative to average 1974-2003) 
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(1) The REER based on consumer price inflation is not shown as it 
is very similar to the one based on the GDP deflator.  
Source: Commission services. 
3. The impact on export growth  
Changes in price competitiveness obviously 
impact on euro-area exports. Graph 21 reveals 
that export growth and REER have moved into 
the same direction for most of the time since the 
second half of the 1990s. On the other hand, 
relatively strong export growth coincided in 
1993/94 with a comparatively strong REER. 
Graph 21: Export performance and REER, euro area 
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Note: Exports includes intra-area trade. 
Source: Commission services. 
In order to arrive at a reliable estimate of the 
sensitivity of euro-area exports to the exchange 
rate, it is important to control for the impact of 
the expansion in world trade on export growth. 
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Commission services’ estimates suggest that the 
exchange rate elasticity of extra-area exports is 
relatively low (see Box 2). It is estimated that a 
10 % appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate reduces extra-area exports by about 2.5%. 
This is a relatively small effect compared to the 
impact of world import demand on euro-area 
exports. It is estimated that if the euro had 
remained at its trough level of October 2000, 
quarter-on-quarter export growth would have 
been about 0.5 percentage point higher than 
actually observed in the past three years. But it 
would have been even much stronger over the 
same period if growth in world import demand 
had recovered to the rates observed in the 1990s. 
As growth in world trade has recovered swiftly in 
the past months, it is likely that the impact of 
world import demand on euro-area exports will 
offset the effect of the euro appreciation. 
Reasons for the muted exchange rate 
elasticity of exports  
One reason why the sensitivity of euro-area 
exports to exchange rates is small relative to the 
income effect is linked to the availability of 
hedging instruments. Given the large potential 
impact of exchange rates on revenues from 
abroad, exporters usually hedge their short-term 
exposure to variations in exchange rates by using 
financial instruments such as futures, swap or 
option contracts.  
As regards longer-term engagements, it matters 
whether changes in exchange rates are considered 
to be transitory or permanent. If entry into the 
foreign market involved specific investment, 
which would be irreversible upon market exit, 
exporters are likely to accept a period of lower 
revenues or even operational losses in order to 
keep market shares provided an exchange rate 
shock is expected to revert in the end. Evidence 
of this behaviour can be derived from the 
pricing-strategies of exporters. For instance, it is 
consistent with the more muted response of the 
REER in export prices to the euro’s weakness 
and rebound than for REER calculated with 
other deflators in Table 5. Graph 22 shows that 
euro-area export prices often moved in tandem 
with foreign prices (in euro) and are less closely 
linked to domestic prices (as measured here by 
unit labour costs). Since prices are stickier than 
exchange rates, the variability in foreign prices (in 
euro) is primarily caused by exchange rate 
variations.  
Graph 22: Export, domestic and foreign prices,  
euro area 
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Source: ECB, Commission services. 
Thus, a second explanation for the muted 
response of export volumes to the exchange rate 
relates to the observation that exporters adjust 
profit margins if the exchange rate is high, cutting 
prices if domestic products are expensive on 
foreign markets and vice versa. Since autumn 
2001, growth in euro-area export prices 
denominated in euro has been slightly negative. 
Profit margins in exports have been used as a 
buffer to compensate partially for the exchange 
rate-induced loss in price competitiveness. 
Graph 23: Profit margins of producers of export goods, 
euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Box 2: How sensitive are extra-area exports to variations in the exchange rate? 
 
To assess the relative importance of trade and exchange rate effects, an empirical model was estimated in which 
extra-area exports of goods and services are explained by world trade and the REER (GDP deflator). Extra-euro 
area exports are based on national account data. However, the latter do not distinguish between intra and extra 
trade and were adjusted for the share of intra-area trade as obtained from trade statistics. Contrary to national 
account trade data (available to 2003:Q4), extra-euro-area trade data were only available to 2003:Q3. The series 
world trade excludes euro-area trade.  
 
The specification is in the form of an error-correction model. This assumes that there is a long-term relationship 
between exports, world trade and the REER. Deviations from this long-term relationship have an impact on the 
short-term dynamics. Despite its simplicity, the estimation produces significant coefficients for all variables, 
explaining about 2/3 of the variation in quarterly export growth since 1991. In addition to the usual caveats that 
apply to econometric estimates, it should be stressed that the sample is rather short, which restricts the reliability of 
econometric tests. 
 
Determinants of extra-area exports, euro area 
(1991:1-2003:3) 
 Long term elasticity 
Short term 
coefficients 
World import 
demand 0.85 0.42 
REER (GDP) -0.26 -0.21 
Deviation from long-term  -0.33 
equilibrium in t-1   
 R**2 0.67 
 Adj. R**2 0.62 
Note: All coefficients significant at 5% level. REER (GDP deflator) 
lagged by 1 period for the short term. The short-term coefficients 
describe the dynamic adjustment in quarter-on-quarter growth rates. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Despite the good overall fit (see left panel in graph on next page), it should be noted that the model produces 
smoother extra-area export growth than actually observed. The strong pick-up of exports in 2003Q3 is 
underestimated while export growth in the preceding quarter is overestimated. This highlights the difficulty in 
interpreting developments in trade in the fourth quarter of 2003 as provided in national accounts. The reported 
sharp slowdown in export growth in the first release of national accounts in Q4 seems to reflect corrections from 
earlier movements to a considerable extent.  
 
Overall, the elasticities obtained appear consistent with estimates in the literature for Member States (see for 
instance Hooper, P. et al. (2000), “Trade Elasticities for the G-7 Countries”, Princeton Studies in International 
Economics No 87). The exchange rate elasticity is generally relatively small, i.e. a 10 per cent real effective 
appreciation would reduce exports by about 2%. The long-term elasticity with respect to world import demand of 
slightly below 1 is in line with the observation that the euro area is loosing market shares over time due to more 
countries having become active in international trade in the 1990s. Adjustment to deviations from the long-term 
equilibrium is relatively fast. The coefficient suggests that a third of the deviation from equilibrium is corrected in 
the subsequent period. Long-term elasticities are higher than short-term elasticities, which is consistent with the 
presence of frictions to adjustment in the short-term.  
 
The exchange rate elasticity is essentially robust to the deflator used. That is, it changes only marginally if consumer 
prices or unit labour costs are used instead of the GDP deflator. It should be noted, however, that the significance 
of the exchange rate elasticity seems to be sensitive to the estimation method. In contrast to the specification used 
here, it is not always significant when alternative methods are used.  
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Actual and estimated export growth, euro area 
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Euro-area export growth: simulation 
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To illustrate the relative importance of REERs and world trade for euro-area exports, two simulations were 
conducted with the estimated equation. The first one assumes a recovery of world trade growth (excluding euro 
area) to its 1991-1999 average from 2001 onwards (Simulation “trade rebound”). The second one uses actual world 
trade growth, but assumes that the REER has remained at its level in the trough of October 2000 (Simulation 
“trough rate”). 
The results suggest the following insights (see right panel of the graph above): 
 
• A REER remaining at its trough-level would have yielded quarter-on-quarter export growth to be 
0.5 percentage point higher on average over 2001-2003. 
• A rebound in world trade growth would have had a more rapid and stronger impact on export growth 
throughout the whole 2001-2003 period and most markedly in 2001. The average gains in quarterly export 
growth, of about 1.3 percentage points, are significantly higher than the 0.5 percentage points registered in 
the previous scenario. 
 
 
Sectoral sensitivity of exports  
In line with the consideration that developments 
in world trade may offset the impact of a loss in 
price competitiveness, industrialists’ assessment 
of export expectations picked up appreciably in 
autumn 2003 despite an appreciating currency. 
Evaluating the replies from the Commission’s 
quarterly business survey, it appears as if export 
optimism has exceeded its long-term average 
(1985-2003) in total manufacturing. However, a 
small deterioration in export sentiment can be 
observed in January 2004, when industrialists 
were surveyed the last time, for manufacturers of 
intermediate goods and capital goods. These two 
market segments constitute two thirds of euro-
area exports. Demand for them is strongly driven 
by foreign income because intermediate goods 
are used in production abroad and capital goods 
are related to investment abroad. 
Graph 24: Assessment of export expectations in 
industry, euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
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In a study conducted for the European 
Commission, Fouquin, et al. (2002) estimated the 
exchange rate elasticities of different 
manufacturing sectors in the EU and the euro 
area.12 By combining sectors’ trade elasticity to 
exchange-rate fluctuations with their exposure to 
competition from the dollar zone, the authors 
shed light on sectors’ exposure to USD/EUR 
fluctuations. Manufacturing sectors both strongly 
exposed and of relatively large importance in the 
euro area are machinery and equipment, electrical 
equipment and transport equipment.13 The 
chemical industry was evaluated as being an 
economically important industry that is relatively 
weakly exposed to USD exchange rate variations. 
Graph 25: Assessment of export outlook by industry 
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Source: Commission services. 
Recent developments in the assessment of the 
export outlook in the Commission’s business 
survey for these most exposed industries do not, 
however, reflect large concern with the recent 
euro appreciation (Graph 25). Export optimism 
in the three sectors highlighted in Fouquin, et al 
(2002) improved in the course of 2003, exceeding 
the long-term average in the two cases for which 
recent data are available.  
                                                     
12  Chapter 5 (Sector sensitivity to exchange-rate fluctuations) 
in European Economy Special Report No 2/2002: 
European integration and the functioning of product 
markets. 
13  Exposure was measured as the decline in the market share 
in response to a 10% depreciation of the USD. 
Differences in the exposure of Member States 
to the US dollar  
Member States differ in openness, industrial 
structure and the geographical destination of 
external trade, causing the euro appreciation to 
have a dissimilar effect on export growth. The 
direct exposure to the USA and the exposure to 
countries that keep their exchange rate close to 
the US dollar can be combined to produce a 
measure of dollar exposure of Member States 
exports. For the euro area as a whole, dollar 
exposure is estimated at 4% of GDP. This is 
significantly higher than the direct exposure to 
the dollar as measured by euro-area exports to 
the USA (2.6% of euro-area GDP). Among the 
euro-area Member States, Greece, Spain, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal have a 
dollar exposure below the euro-area average.  
Exposure in Germany, Netherlands and Finland 
is not far above the average wile Belgium and 
Ireland with respectively 10.9% and 12.6% of 
GDP dollar exposure are clear outliers.  
Graph 26: Export growth and dollar exposure 2002-03 in 
Member States 
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Source: Commission services.  
Member States with higher measured exposure 
recorded higher average export growth in the 
period of dollar strength and lower rates in the 
period 2002-2003, when the euro was stronger 
against the USD (see graph 26). 
Two additional factors may have further 
contributed to widen differences in Member 
States’ exports growth. First, euro-area sales that 
depend directly on US market conditions extend 
beyond exports of goods and services to the 
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USA. As a result of substantial inflow of euro-
area FDI into the USA, total sales by US affiliates 
of euro-area firms amounted to 13.8% of euro-
area GDP in 2002 or 11.9 after adjustment for 
double-counting of exports. The share is above 
10% in Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland. 
Second, some countries have a high share in 
industries that are particularly exposed to the 
USD. Germany, France, Austria and Finland are 
the four countries where the share of the 3 most 
exchange rate-sensitive industries (machinery and 
equipment, electrical and optical equipment, 
transport equipment) is the highest in the euro 
area. 
Graph 27: Production share (1) of US dollar sensitive 
sectors in the  euro area (average 1999-2002) (2) 
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Source: Commission services.  
4. The impact on domestic prices  
The beneficial impact of an exchange rate 
appreciation on domestic demand depends on 
the size and speed with which the improvement 
in terms of trade is passed through via import 
prices to domestic consumer prices. So far, it has 
been difficult to present clear evidence for the 
reversal of this effect in response to the 
appreciation of the euro. An apparent positive 
effect witnessed so far is that the increase in oil 
prices in USD terms since 2002 has not translated 
into similar rises in energy prices because of the 
counterbalancing effect of the rising euro. 
Exchange rate and import prices  
An exchange rate appreciation has the immediate 
favourable effect of reducing import prices. 
Graph 28 shows that import price inflation – as 
measured by the import unit value index from 
trade statistics - has fallen strikingly from above 
25 % year-on-year in early 2000 to negative rates 
since autumn 2001.14 The decline is more muted 
in terms of the national accounts’ import 
deflators because those also include intra-area 
trade prices. A visual inspection already suggests 
a strong link between import prices and exchange 
rate movements. Deviations between both series 
appear to have predominantly been driven by 
shifts in oil prices.  
Empirical estimates in the academic literature 
usually find that exchange rate pass-through for 
the euro area as a whole is rapid and large to 
import prices in the order of 50 to 70%. Box 3 
provides further support for this hypothesis. 
Graph 28: External price developments, euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
  
                                                     
14 The production of quantitative evidence on the 
transmission of exchange rate changes via trade prices to 
domestic price indices still suffers from the lack of 
ordinary price indices for extra-euro-area exports or 
imports. Import prices are readily available in the national 
accounts. They do not, however, distinguish between 
extra and intra-area trade. The unit value indices, which 
are calculated in foreign trade statistics, allow 
discrimination between internal and external prices but 
differ substantially in methodology from regular price 
indices. 
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Box 3. The impact of the euro appreciation on import prices 
 
Econometric analysis supports the notion that import price inflation responds strongly and quickly to oil prices and 
exchange rates. As shown in the table below, contemporary changes in the NEER and oil prices explain more than 
half of the variation in quarterly import price inflation even if no further lags are assumed (short-term model). 
Assuming the existence of a long-term relationship between the price indices (error correction model) improves the 
fit, while short-term elasticities remain about the same. The estimation with an error-correction term suggests that 
deviations from the long-term equilibrium are corrected relatively quickly.  
 
Euro-area import price inflation,  
determinants and elasticities  
(1991Q2-2003Q3) 
 Error correction model 
 
Short-term 
model (1) 
Short-term 
dynamics  
Long-term 
relation (2) 
Oil price 0.134 0.123 0.128 
NEER -0.622 -0.578 -0.701 
Core inf. Ns ns 1.400 
Deviation from (2) NA -0.318 NA 
R**2 0.685 0.752 NA 
(1) Based on quarter-on-quarter changes. 
Note: All coefficients significant at 5% level. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Although the short sample suggests that estimation results should be considered with caution, there is some 
evidence that foreign exporters adjust prices to local conditions, similar to the behaviour of euro-area exporters on 
foreign markets. This result is also supported by the existing empirical literature. For instance, Warmerdiger (2004) 
finds pricing-to market effects to be important in the four largest euro area Member States and the euro area as a 
whole (Warmerdinger, T. (2004): “Import prices and pricing-to-market effects in the euro area”, ECB Working 
Paper No 299). 
 
 Actual and estimated import price inflation 
euro area (based on unit value index data) 
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 Source: Commission services.  
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The pass-through to consumer prices  
Exchange rate pass-through is distinctly more 
muted and lagged to producer and consumer 
prices than for import prices. Evidence from 
recent empirical studies confirms that the size of 
the pass-through decreases whereas the 
adjustment lags increase along the distribution 
chain of exchange rate changes to final prices. 
For producer and consumer prices there is 
generally little effect on impact. Most of the 
effect occurs with a lag of around 1½ to 2 years, 
with consumer prices showing a more delayed 
response than producer prices.15 
Graph 29: Pass-through of import price inflation to 
domestic price developments, euro area 
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Source: Commission services.  
Graph 29 shows that producer prices in the 
manufacturing sector followed import price 
movements closely but with a lag of 3 to 4 
months over the 1999-03 period. A relationship 
between import prices and core consumer prices 
is hardly visible in the chart.  
Table 6 provides further support for the 
hypothesis that the speed of pass-through 
diminishes in the course of the chain of 
distribution. Goods prices seem to be at least 
loosely linked to the development of producer 
prices. The remaining items, i.e. service prices 
appear to account for the stickiness of consumer 
price inflation.  
                                                     
15 For a recent study, see Faruqee (2004), “Exchange rate 
pass-through in the euro area: the role of asymmetric 
pricing behaviour”, IMF Working Paper No 04/14. For 
an overview, see EU Economy 2003 Review, Chapter 1. 
The economic literature finds that the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through typically depends on 
a number of interrelated microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors. The most important 
ones are the state of overall demand (cyclical 
conditions), whether the exchange rate change is 
perceived to be temporary or permanent, whether 
the country (destination/origin) is large or small, 
the industry-specific market structure, product 
characteristics as well as the macroeconomic 
policy set-up, in particular the degree of 
credibility of monetary policy. 
Table 6: Correlation of euro area price indices with 
import price inflation (y-o-y) 1994-2003 
 Maximum correlation Lag in months 
Energy 0.91 0 
Fuels 0.92 0 
Domestic producer prices 
Industry 0.79 3 
Industry excl energy  0.55 5 
Consumer prices 
Industrial goods 0.80 0 
Goods 0.64 7 
Services 0.56 24 
HICP 0.41 8 
Core inflation 0.59 23 
Note:  Import price is unit value index for extra-area imports of 
goods. Producer prices excluding construction. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
A number of factors suggest that it may take 
significant time before full price adjustment is 
achieved in the euro area.  
• Consumer price inflation is still low, which 
is expected to slow down the pass-through 
because price adjustment costs may be 
prohibitive if the change in prices is small. 
• Prices are generally considered as sticky in 
the euro area. This is for instance evidenced 
by the substantial lag with which prices 
respond to changes in demand. 
• Competitive pressure is low in many sectors, 
in particular the service economy. The more 
producers are exposed to competition, the 
stronger the pressure to quickly pass 
through lower costs to consumer prices. 
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Considering the lags of up to 3 years in the pass-
through from import price inflation to core 
inflation, the potentially large dis-inflationary 
effect of the euro appreciation should materialise 
in the near future.  
5. The impact via other transmission 
channels 
In addition to the effect on exports and domestic 
prices, exchange rate movements may impact on 
economic activity through capital flows and 
economic confidence. Relatively little is known, 
however, about the quantitative impact of these 
channels. 
If the exchange rate appreciation was caused by a 
shift in relative risk preferences towards euro-area 
investments, the euro area could hope to benefit 
from a smaller risk premium and thereby lower 
capital costs. Such a shift in relative risk 
preferences should show up in a re-direction of 
capital flows in the balance of payments. 
Graph 30: Net capital flows, euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
Generally, capital flows are too volatile to allow 
identifying trend breaks early and with certainty. 
As regards capital flows from and to the euro 
area over the last years, it appears that net 
outflows in FDI have declined over time (see 
Graph 30). As regards portfolio investments, net 
inflows dominated in 2002, a trend which 
continued in 2003 for portfolio investment in 
equity but not for investment in debt securities.  
The weakness of the USD also affects revenues 
from capital income abroad, which has a 
detrimental impact on the cash-position of euro-
area residents and thereby possibly also on their 
investment behaviour. Since euro-area residents 
invested heavily abroad when the USD was 
strong, one would assume them to have realised 
capital losses in proportion to the euro 
appreciation. Graph 31 suggests an inverse 
relationship between the effective exchange rate 
and income from investment abroad. Between 
2000Q4 and the most recent observation in 
2003Q3, investment income from abroad 
declined by about 20 billion euro. This fall is 
significant if one takes into account that quarterly 
trade surpluses amounted to 26 billion euro on 
average over the same period. It is also equivalent 
to approximately 4% of the euro-area’s adjusted 
gross operating surplus.16 
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Source: Commission services. 
Because euro area companies invested heavily in 
the US during the nineties, their profitability and 
balance sheets were negatively affected by the US 
recession in 2001 and the subsequent rise in the 
bilateral EUR/USD exchange rate. While not 
fully capturing all the transmission channels from 
an appreciation to entrepreneurial and capital 
income (squeeze of profit margins, lower capital 
return in euro, deprecation of capital), Graph 32 
relates US exposure to the percentage change in 
nominal gross operating surplus between 2000 
and 2003. In a similar vein, Graph 33 relates US 
                                                     
16 GDP minus labour income (compensation of employees 
minus imputed compensation of self-employed). 
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exposure to the percentage change in real 
investment between 2000 and 2003. Growth in 
the gross operating surplus is faster in the 
Member States with the smallest exposure to the 
US, namely Spain, Italy and Austria. These three 
countries also have above-euro-area-average 
investment growth. The Netherlands and 
Germany, with high US exposure, experienced a 
significant contraction in investment. However, 
the example of Portugal (smallest US exposure, 
largest investment contraction) underlines the 
fact that US exposure is only one of the many 
factors influencing the investment performance. 
This fact is also illustrated by the outlying 
position of Greece (for investment), which is 
related to the preparation of the Olympic Games. 
Graph 32: Profitability and US exposure,  
euro area and Member State 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 33: Investment and US exposure,  
euro area and Member State 
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Source: Commission services. 
The impact of the euro appreciation on economic 
confidence may constitute a further potentially 
important transmission channel. In particular, if 
exchange rates record historical highs or lows, 
attention in the news is high and the public 
perceives the exchange rate to be of more 
importance than in ordinary times. This might 
affect their perception of the economic outlook 
in general and their business or employment 
prospects in particular. There is some concern 
that agents place too much emphasise on the 
euro appreciation than would be justified. For 
instance, economic analysts related the recent 
pause in the upward trend in confidence 
indicators to the strengthening of the euro. A key 
question is whether the pause just reflects the 
perceived impact of the appreciation on 
economic activity or whether there is scope for 
overshooting in expectations. Disentangling any 
“overshooting” effects in confidence indicators is 
difficult. The design of a possible empirical test 
of overshooting is presented in Box 4 on the next 
page. Reassuringly, the test does not provide any 
evidence of overshooting in expectations. 
6. Evidence from macro-econometric 
simulations 
The simulation of an exchange rate shock with 
macro-econometric models may shed some 
additional light on the impact of the euro 
appreciation. The main advantage of applying 
macro-econometric models is that they allow 
account to be taken of the interactions between 
the different transmission channels analysed 
above. A disadvantage of the use of sophisticated 
macro-econometric models is the fact that 
exchange rates are usually endogenously 
determined. In the Commission’s QUEST model, 
for instance, exchange rate movements are the 
consequence of shocks to other exogenous 
variables. 
In order to arrive at a reliable estimate of the 
impact of an appreciation on economic activity, it 
is imperative to identify the underlying shock. 
However, standard shocks of monetary or fiscal 
policy, similar in size to policy measures 
observed, generally yield much smaller exchange  
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Box 4: How do the changes in foreign exchange rates influence expectations? 
From its low on 26 October 2000 to 17 February 2004 the euro-dollar exchange rate has risen by 56 %. In the 
short term there is some concern about how a rapid appreciation affects expectations. The worry is that the 
euro appreciation feeds into expectations and leads to overreactions by economic agents. Eventually this could 
have a negative influence on domestic demand. Firms might reconsider their investment plans, or they might 
seek strong productivity gains by shedding labour. If such scenarios materialised, households and firms could 
become more cautious, reinforcing precautionary behaviour, and thereby depressing confidence. The main 
aim of this box is to shed some light on the issue of overreactions in expectations.  
 
In the joint harmonised EU industry survey there are two time series that can be interpreted as expectations of 
future growth in euro-area industrial production and exports. The survey on production expectations is 
conducted on a monthly basis, while the survey on export expectations is conducted quarterly. Both these 
series, and their reference series on actual growth in euro-area industrial production and exports, are 
potentially influenced by fluctuations in exchange rates. Assuming that firms correctly take into account all the 
relevant information, their expectation error (e.g. the difference between expected export growth and realised 
export growth) should be uncorrelated with all the information, including information on exchange rates. For 
the purpose of testing this hypothesis, year-on-year growth rates of euro-area industrial production and 
exports are used. The real effective exchange rate is used for information about exchange rate developments. 
The test procedure has two stages. The first is to establish that exchange rates do influence industrial 
production, exports, and expectations. The second stage is to test if expectation errors are uncorrelated with 
exchange rates, i.e. that no systematic mistakes are made when expectations are formed. To establish that the 
exchange rate matters for real and expected industrial production and exports, the real variables and the 
expectation variables are regressed on the relative change of the real effective exchange rate. The results show 
that changes in real exchange rates matter for both real variables and expectations, and explain between 11 and 
31 percent (the R-square) of the variation in industrial production and exports. 
 
The expectation error is defined as the difference between the expectation and the one-period-ahead outcome 
of the reference variable, e.g. the difference between expected production growth in November 2003 and 
realised production growth in December 2003. The expectation error is formed by taking the residual series 
from the regression of expectations on the one-period-ahead outcome. To test whether expectations are 
formed correctly and that no overshooting occurs, the expectation errors are regressed on a constant and the 
relative change in the real effective exchange rate. The coefficients should not be significantly different from 
zero for expectations to reflect all available information. For example, if the coefficient is significantly 
negative, this would mean that an appreciation leads to a negative expectation error, i.e. too low expected 
industrial production. The negative effect of an increase in the exchange rate would be over emphasised, 
leading to an overshooting. 
 
Expectation error regressed on relative change in euro-area real effective exchange rate 
Expectation error Exchange rate coefficients relative change (y-o-y) 
Industrial production 0.03 
Exports value 0.20 
Exports volume 0.13 
None of the coefficients is significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The table presents the coefficients from the regressions. None of the coefficients on the change in the 
exchange rate are significant, which means that the people asked in the surveys appear to form expectations 
correctly. Thus, there is no evidence of any systematic misinterpretation of exchange rate appreciation within 
the framework applied, i.e. there is no indication of an overshooting in expectations. 
 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 33 - 
Finally it is important to stress that the analysis presented in this box focuses on the expectations of producers 
rather than financial investors. The possibility of overreactions in exchange rate expectations by financial 
investors has given rise to an important economic literature. For instance, research in behavioural finance 
suggests that – if information is costly – it may be rational for agents not to use all available information but to 
apply simple behavioural rules. This may give rise to herding behaviour and deviations of exchange rates from 
fundamental values (For a recent application, see Grimaldi and De Grauwe (2004): “Exchange rates in a 
behavioural finance framework”, mimeo, University of Leuven).  
 
rate movements than observed in the real 
world.17 For instance, in order to yield a 10% 
appreciation of the euro against the USD in the 
Quest model, one would need to simulate a 
widening of the short-term interest rate spread 
between the USA and the euro area by 7 
percentage points. This is difficult to reconcile 
with actual developments. 
The following simulation shows that the impact 
on economic activity of an appreciation, when 
following a previous depreciation, can be 
modest, with the economy returning to 
equilibrium relatively quickly.  
Table 7: Simulated effect of a depreciation of the 
euro driven by shocks to productivity and risk 
premium in the USA 
(difference from baseline in per cent) 
 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 
GDP -0.1 -0.2 0.0 
Consumption *) -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 
Investment *) -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 
Net exports *) 0.1 0.6 1.1 
Inflation (%pts) 0.0 0.2 0.2 
USD/Euro -4.5 -10.8 -15.3 
Note: *) contribution to GDP. Percentage points difference from 
baseline. 
Source: Commission services 
 
The simulation shown in Table 7 is based on 
the scenario of a sharp correction of capital 
flows. It builds on an explanation that has been 
popular in the past to explain the weakness of 
the euro against the USD. The starting point is 
the expectation of a permanent increase in 
productivity growth in the USA, which induces 
                                                     
17 For some recent macro-econometric simulations of the 
spill-over of selected shocks originating in the USA on 
the euro area, see, Meyermans, E. (2003), “The 
international transmission of shocks”, Federal Planning 
Bureau Working Paper No 9/03. 
a downward revision of risk premiums on US 
assets (year -3 in Table 9). This explanation 
would fit with the observed depreciation of the 
euro between 1999 and 2000. After an 
overshooting of the exchange rate in the first 
years, the simulations would yield a gradual 
return to the initial exchange rate level in the 
medium term.   
Table 8: Simulated effect of a 10% appreciation of 
the euro driven by a sharp correction of previous 
expectations 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
GDP 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Consumption *) -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 
Investment *) -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
Net exports *) 0.7 0.3 0.3 
Inflation (%pts) -0.1 -0.0 0.0 
USD/Euro -3.4 -1.4 -0.3 
Note: *) contribution to GDP. Percentage (points) difference from 
baseline. 
Source: Commission services 
 
The scenario now assumes a sharp correction of 
both productivity expectations and investors 
perceptions of risks (Year 0 in Table 8). This 
causes the adjustment back to equilibrium to 
take place through an abrupt reversal of capital 
flows and a sharp fall in the value of the USD 
(from 15.3% below the baseline in Year -1 to 
3.4% below the baseline in Year 0). In this 
scenario, the impact on economic activity is 
small. GDP growth would transitorily decline in 
year 1. Inflation would only be marginally 
affected. If the simulation is continued to 
year 3, the impact of the shock would have died 
out and GDP growth and inflation would be 
back at the baseline, i.e. if no upward and 
downward revision of productivity expectations 
had taken place. 
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III. References to further work 
1. Policy documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 4. 2003.  
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines BEPGs for the 2003-05 period. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/broadeconomypolicyguidelines2
003_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 5. 2003.  
Economic Forecasts, Autumn  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 6. 2003 
The EU Economy. 2003 Review  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/the_eu_economy_review_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 1. 2004 
The report on the implementation of the 2003 - 2005 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/implement2003_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGEMENT PAPERS. No. 17. September 2003  
Main results of the April 2003 fiscal notifications presented by the candidate countries 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp17_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGEMENT PAPERS. No. 18. September 2003  
The Financial sector in Bulgaria 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp18_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGEMENT PAPERS. No. 19. November 2003  
Progress towards meeting economic criteria for accession: the assessment from the 2003 comprehensive 
monitoring reports and regular report 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp19_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGEMENT PAPERS. No. 20. November 2003 
2003 pre-accession economic programmes of acceding and other candidate countries: overview and 
assessment 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp20_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT No 2 2002 
European integration and the functioning of product markets  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/eespecialreport0202_en.htm 
2. Analytical documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 195.  
Gabriele Giudice, Alessandro Turrini and Jan in ’t Veld 
Can fiscal consolidations be expansionary in the EU? Ex-post evidence and ex-ante analysis 
This paper analyses non-Keynesian effects in fiscal consolidations in the EU. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers195_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 196.  
Heikki Oksanen  
Population ageing and public finance targets  
The paper incorporates intergenerational fairness into a framework to analyse long-term sustainability of public 
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finances under population ageing.  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers196_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 197.  
Giuseppe Carone, Aino Salomäki 
Herwig Immervoll and Dominique Paturot (OECD, Social Policy Division)  
Indicators of unemployment and low-wage traps (marginal effective tax rates on labour) 
This paper presents results of an on-going joint European Commission / OECD project, aimed at monitoring the 
direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on household incomes. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers197_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 198.  
Servaas Deroose, Sven Langedijk and Werner Roeger 
Reviewing adjustment dynamics in EMU: from overheating to overcooling 
This paper analyses how adjustment dynamics, in an environment with some degree of price and wage rigidity, may 
create and strengthen asymmetric developments in a monetary union. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers198_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 199.  
Andre Jungmittag (European Institute for International Economic Relations) 
Innovations, technological specialisation and economic growth in the EU 
The paper analyses the effects of innovations, technological specialisation and technology diffusion on economic 
growth and convergence of the EU countries from 1969 to 1998.  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers199_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 200.  
Christoph Walkner 
Issues in corporate governance 
The objective of this paper is to review issues and problems arising in the area of corporate governance from a 
broader economic perspective at a time when a series of major corporate accounting fraud scandals has renewed 
interest in the subject.  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers200_en.htm 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, 
the maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -9 -8 -6 -8 -6 -6
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 1.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.4
  2001 2002 2003* 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Ann. % ch 1.5 0.8 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.6
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.3
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -17 -17 -16 -16 -15 -14
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.3 1.3 0.2 0.9 -1.7 -1.0 1.0
  2001 2002 2003* 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 
 Private consumption 2.3 qoq %ch. 1.8 0.6 1.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2  81.5 81.1 80.8 80.7 81.2 80.7 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -1.9 2.0 0.3 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 0.6  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.5  
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8  
   2001 2002 2003* 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8  3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0   
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.4   
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22  -25 -24 -19 -19 -19 -20 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 6454 6309  521 509 507    
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 823.4 91.2 97.6 88.1 87.7   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 828.1 82.0 88.0 83.0 82.0   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 -4.7 9.2 9.6 5.1 5.7   
   2001 2002 2003* 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 4.3 0.7 6.1 -0.4 -1.5 -0.9 2.3 0.2  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 6.2 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.8 2.1  
   2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR -12.3 9.6 11.0 7.7 8.0 2.1 2.5   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -90.4  -9.6 -10.6 6.5 -1.8   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 38.0  8.3 26.7 -4.3 -8.6   
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7  1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0 0.3  
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 102.2 102.4  102.3 101.9     
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3  2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8  4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.1 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053  2553 2515 2618 2702 2839 2875 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6  8.0 7.7 7.5 7.0   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7  5.0 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.5  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.12 1.17 1.17 1.23 1.26 1.26 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.2 105.8 107.6 107.4 110.4 111.1 110.7 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Bn; EUR, current prices, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions; before 1997 partly estimated ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit values for goods Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
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7.5 M3  Annual percentage growth rate of seasonally adjusted flows, moving average 
(3 last months): from 1997 onwards corrected for holdings by non-residents  
ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
Annual percentage change, MFI loans to euro area residents excluding MFIs 
and general government, monthly values: month end values, annual values: 
annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages, until December 1998: USD/ECU rates ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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